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MEDITERRANEAN PROTOCOL ON LAND-BASED
SOURCES: REGIONAL RESPONSE TO A
PRESSING TRANSNATIONAL
PROBLEM
The sewage-infested waters off the coast of Israel have driven away the fish,
sharply pushing up prices. In Badalona, Spain, a day on the beach ended in
hypochlorite poisoning for twenty people who swam in toxic wastes from a
bleach factory. Yugoslavia's seaside resorts have been warned that typhus
and cholera epidemics may occur if present pollution levels are not reduced.
The once pellucid Mediterranean Sea, declared Rome's I1 Messaggero, has
become a "stinking puddle."'
The Mediterranean Sea,2 a center of western civilization for well over
four thousand years, has become one of the world's most severely polluted
water bodies. 3 Although the Convention for the Protection of the Mediter-
ranean Sea Against Pollution (Barcelona Convention)4 represents an ambi-
tious attempt to combat Mediterranean pollution, it fails to deal with the
1. Newsweek, Sept. 3, 1979, at 47.
2. For the purposes of this Note, the Mediterranean Sea includes the sea's waters, as well
as its gulfs and dependent seas, from the Straits of Gibralter to the southern limits of the
Straits of the Dardanelles. There are 18 Mediterranean littoral states: Albania, Algeria, Cy-
prus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahirya, Malta, Monaco,
Morocco, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.
3. See notes 34-47 infra and accompanying text.
4. Done Feb. 16, 1976 (in force Feb. 12, 1978), reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
290 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Barcelona Convention]. The Barcelona Conference adopted
two protocols. See generally Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution of the
Mediterranean Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency, done Feb.
16, 1976 (inforce Feb. 12, 1978), reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 306 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Protocol on Emergencies]; Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediter-
ranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, done Feb. 16, 1976 (in force Feb. 12, 1978),
reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 300 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Protocol on Dump-
ing]. The role of these protocols is to "prescrib[e] agreed measures, procedures and standards
for the implementation of this Convention." Barcelona Convention, supra, art. 4(2). As of
February, 1979, 11 Mediterranean states had ratified the Convention and at least one of the
protocols. With the exception of Albania, which did not attend the Barcelona Conference, all
the Mediterranean states are expected to ratify the Convention before 1981. [1979] 2 INT'L
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 507. For general discussions of the Convention and its original protocols,
see Kiss, Rocents Traitbs Rgionaux Concernant la Pollution de la Mer, 22 ANNUAIRE FRAN-
CAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 720 (1976); Note, The United Nations Environment Program:
The Mediterranean Conferences, 17 HARV. INT'I L.J. 639 (1976); Robinson, Convention for the
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, 2 EARTH L.J. 289 (1976).
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most serious threat to the Mediterranean marine environment-pollution
from land-based sources.5
On May 17, 1980, the Mediterranean coastal nations confronted the
land-based pollution problem by formally adopting the Protocol for the
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from Land-Based
Sources (Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources).6 This Note ex-
amines the approach to the land-based pollution problem adopted by this
Protocol. The discussion begins with an overview of the global land-based
pollution problem. The Note then examines the land-based pollution prob-
lem in the Mediterranean region and briefly describes the new Protocol.
Finally, this Note concludes with an assessment of the agreement in light of
other regional accords of its type.
BACKGROUND TO TRANSNATIONAL CONTROL OF
LAND-BASED SOURCES OF MARINE
POLLUTION
A. LAND-BASED POLLUTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Mankind's impingement on the oceans has reached crisis proportions. 7
Since marine pollution knows no boundaries, the need for international
controls is paramount.8 Although the international community has
attempted to deal with the problems of dumping9 and oil spills, t0 there are
5. Experts estimate that 85% of all Mediterranean marine pollution originates from land-
based sources and, hence, falls outside the ambit of the original protocols. [1979] INT'L ENVIR.
REP. (BNA) 507. The Barcelona Convention, supra note 4, contains a provision on land-based
sources, but its language is far too general to impose any specific obligations on the parties.
See notes § 61-62 infra and accompanying text.
6. Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from Land-
Based Sources, openedfor signature May 18, 1980 (on file at the office of the Cornell Interna-
tional Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources].
The author wishes to thank Mr. Aldo Manos, coordinator of the Mediterranean Action Plan,
for assistance in providing copies of the Final Act, note 71 infra, and the Protocol as adopted.
7. It is incredible that so little attention has been paid to the enormous damage we
have done to life in the seas. This is arguably our greatest environmental blunder and
yet it is one that is rarely mentioned .... It could well be that marine pollution is a
much more critical problem than any other form of environmental assault.
C. MOORCRAFT, MUST THE SEAS DIE? x (1973). Seegeneral l IMPINGEMENT OF MAN ON THE
OCEANS (D. Hood ed. 1971); LA POLLUTION DES EAUX MARINES (J. M. Peres ed. 1976);
MARINE POLLUTION (R. Johnston ed. 1976).
8. See A. Kiss, SURVEY OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW 12-16 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Convention on The Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and other Matter, openedfor signature Dec. 29, 1972, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1294 (1972).
10. See, e.g., International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, done Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in II INT'L LEGAL
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presently no global agreements concerning the most serious menace to the
marine environment-the continual discharge of industrial, agricultural,
and human wastes into the sea. I I
Customary international law fails to squarely address the issue of land-
based pollution. Due to the absence of dispositive international judicial or
arbitral decisions on point, it is arguable that, absent fault, no government
is liable to another nation for pollution originating within the former's
jurisdiction.' 2 Given the inconclusive state of international custom regard-
MATERIALS 284 (1972); Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200 (in force Sept. 30, 1962); International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Seas by Oil, done May 12, 1954 (inforce July 26, 1958). Public outcry follow-
ing spectacular oil spills such as the Torrey Canyon incident was largely responsible for the
conclusion of numerous multilateral agreements on oil pollution. See general ToRREY CAN-
YON POLLUTION AND MARINE LIFE (J.E. Smith ed. 1968).
11. "While it may be true that a growing body of international law exists to deal with
ocean-based pollution, which in certain respects overlaps into the area of land-based pollution,
the majority of high seas pollution comes from land-based sources and remains largely uncon-
trolled." Hickey, Custom and Land-Based Pollution of the High Seas, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
409, 420-21 (1978) (footnotes omitted). For an exhaustive current bibliography of literature on
marine pollution, see N. PAPADAKIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: A BIBLIOGRAPHY
(1980).
12. The issue of transnational liability for marine pollution damage is of vital importancc.
Without such liability, states may not have the incentive to enact strict pollution control legis-
lation. Many commentators now agree that nations are strictly liable under international cus-
tom for pollution emanating from their territory. See, e.g., J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 69-82 (1974); LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POL-
LUTION (1977); Brownlie, .4 Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental Protec-
tion, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (1974); Hickey, supra note 11; Moore, Legal
Aspects of Marine Pollution Control, in MARINE POLLUTION 589 (R. Johnston ed. 1976);
Teclaff, International Law and the Protection of the Oceansfrom Pollution, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 104 (1974). Most of these commentators assert that the doctrine of sic
utere tuo, as applied in Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1949), reprinted
in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941), and The Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 4, applies by
analogy to render the polluting nation strictly liable for land-based pollution damages. The
doctrine comes from the ancient strict liability maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
(use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another). It is also referred to
as the "good neighbour" principle or the "principle of the harmless use of territory." LEGAL
ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION, supra, at 349.
The claim in Trail Smelter Arbitration arose when an American smelter emitted noxious
fumes that damaged property in Canada. The arbitrators found the United States liable under
international law for damages, stating that "no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another...
when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence." 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965, reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684. The case has
perhaps been overemphasized as support for the proposition that nations are strictly liable for
marine pollution. Its nature as an arbitral award, as opposed to a court holding, limits its
precedential value. J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, supra, at 75-76.
In The Corfu Channel Case, the court held Albania liable to Britain for damages from mines
placed in Albanian waters. The court based its decision upon a nation's duty to prevent its
territory from being used to the detriment of another nation. The majority's reliance on Alba-
nia's actual knowledge of the mines may mean that fault is a requirement for governmental
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ing land-based pollution liability, the need for positive law on the subject is
particularly acute.
For several reasons, the international legal community has failed to
develop precise rules governing land-based marine pollution. Until re-
cently, scientific knowledge of the extent of environmental harm attributa-
ble to land-based pollutants was inadequate. 13 Moreover, waste-treatment
technology was either unavailable, or too expensive to implement.' 4 This
prohibitive cost factor caused the developing nations, which feared that
forced pollution control expenditures might impede their march toward in-
dustrial development, to be reluctant to negotiate agreements. 15 Finally,
because causation is difficult to prove in the typical effluent pollution
case, 16 nations have been unable or unwilling to assert claims whose resolu-
tion might yield a body of decisional or customary law. The complexity of
land-based pollution control, coupled with the divergent interests of devel-
liability for the acts of third parties. But Vl [1949] I.C.J. at 44 (Alvarez, J. concurring) (nation
has a duty to know "of prejudicial acts committed in parts of its territory where local authori-
ties are installed"). Recent events such as the Ixtoc I oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico may show
the ability of countries to refute successfully the strict liability argument. Ixtoc I, an off-shore
drilling rig owned and operated by the Mexican national company PEMEX, blew out on June
3, 1979. At the height of the spill, the well was gushing more than 30,000 barrels of crude oil
per day into the Gulf of Mexico. By August 28, the oil spill affected more than 130 miles of
Texas beaches, and Texas authorities reported a 65% decline in tourism. The U.S. State
Department claimed that Mexico was strictly liable for the damage to the Texas beaches.
[1979] INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 798, 841.
Mexico refused to enter into negotiations concerning liability and compenstion for the spill.
On October 2, 1979, President Portillo stated flatly that Mexico would not pay for the damage
to the American tourist and shrimp industries or for clean-up costs. Mexico contends that it
was not negligent and, therefore, denies liability under international custom for damages.
[1979] INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 841, 898.
13. See C. MOORCRAFT, supra note 7, at 5-6; Schachter & Serwer, Marine Pollution
Problems and Remedies 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 85 (1971).
14. See S. ODA, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN OUR TIME-I: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, 1966-1975
214 (1977); Waldichuck, Controloffarine Pollution: An EssayReview, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
L.J. 269, 276 (1977).
15. The dispute between developing and developed nations is the major obstacle to inter-
national environmental control. Many developing nations consider pollution control to be a
luxury that only developed nations can afford and feel that the economic burdens imposed by
global standards will only serve to condemn developing nations to permanent poverty. See R.
HALLMAN, TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND LAW OF THE SEA 25-26 (1974); A. Kiss,
supra note 8, at 11; Abrams, The Environmental Problem of the Oceans: An International
Stepchild of National Egotism, 5 ENVT'L AFFAIRS 3, 32 (1976); Udall, Some Second Thoughts
on Stockholm, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 717, 720 (1973).
16. The difficulty lies in tracing the damaging pollutant to its source. When the damaging
pollutant is a rare substance, causation may not be difficult to prove. In the usual case, how-
ever, conclusive proof of the origin of an effluent is impossible because of the gradual and
cumulative nature of the harm. See LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION, supra
note 12, at 290-91.
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oping and developed nations, makes comprehensive global agreement un-
likely in the immediate future.17
Regional agreements between countries in a limited geographical area
offer such countries the chance to fill the void created by the failure of
nations to develop global solutions. Moreover, regional agreements may
avoid the conflicting political and economic interests that negotiators are
unable to harmonize at the global level. 18 Many commentators feel that
regional arrangements offer the only viable means for controlling transna-
tional marine pollution.' 9 In addition, negotiators at the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea supported the regional approach.20
The semi-enclosed seas were the first to feel the effects of transnational
land-based pollution because their lack of substantial contact with the high
seas prevented adequate water transfer. 2' Consequently, the semi-enclosed
seas were the most logical starting point for the development of regional
transnational standards governing the land-based discharge of pollutants.22
All states bordering a semi-enclosed sea naturally possess a common inter-
est in controlling the environmental degradation of that sea, thereby mak-
ing transnational cooperation between such states especially feasible.
The first successful efforts to conclude regional land-based pollution
control agreements involved the coastal nations of the North Sea and Baltic
Sea areas. The two resulting agreements provide important comparisons to
the Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources. Such comparisons are
17. Although the negotiators to the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
have made considerable progress in recent years toward the adoption of a comprehensive
agreement, the Conference remains divided over several crucial issues. The most important of
these issues involves deep sea-bed mining, with developed nations and the Group of 77 dis-
agreeing on the nature and authority of an international mining regime. See Oxman, The
Third United Nations Conference on the Law ofthe Sea: The Seventh Session (1978), 73 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 30-38 (1979). Agreement does not appear likely in the near future, and 1979 may
have been a "make or break" year for the negotiations. [1979] INTr'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 627,
667.
18. See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
19. "[T]here has come to be a greater recognition of the need for regional pollution control
organs since it is apparent that, although pollution is a global problem, it is not uniformly
global." Schachter and Serwer, supra note 13, at I 11. See generally REGIONALIZATION OF THE
LAW OF THE SEA (D. Johnston ed. 1978); Alexander, Regionalirrangements in the Oceans, 71
AM. J. INT'L L. 84 (1977); Mensah, The Law Relating to the Pollution of the Seas, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLLUTION CONTROL 174, 196 (1974); Okidi, TowardfRegionalArrangementsfor Reg
ulation of Marine Pollution: An Appraisal of Options, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 1 (1977).
20. See United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea: Revised Informal Com-
posite Negotiating Text for the Eighth Session, art. 276, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.
1, reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 686, 777 (1979).
21. See generaly Alexander, Regionaiism and the Law of the Sea: The Case of Semi-
enclosed Seas, 2 OCEAN DEy. & INT'L L.J. 151 (1974).
22. One commentator notes that there are 25 semi-enclosed seas in the world. Semi-
enclosed seas with special pollution problems include the Baltic, Mediterranean, North, and
Caribbean Seas. Of these, the Mediterranean has the lowest percentage of water in contact
with the open sea. Id. at 155-59.
1980]
334 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:329
especially valuable in view of the different political and economic situations
existing in the North Sea, Baltic, and Mediterranean regions.23 Further-
more, the comparison of these three regional agreements may suggest possi-
ble solutions to land-based pollution in the world's other twenty-two semi-
enclosed seas,24 and may provide the model for a future global pollution
control scheme.25
The serious pollution problem in the North Sea led to the 1974 Confer-
ence on the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources.26
The resulting Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from
Land-Based Sources (Paris Convention)27 applies to the North Sea region
and a portion of the northern Atlantic.28 The region was a natural birth-
place for international land-based pollution cooperation since all the parties
to the conference were developed nations with similar political ideologies.2 9
The absence of political and economic disputes in the region promoted rati-
23. The region covered by the Paris Convention, see notes 28-30 infra and accompanying
text, was an appropriate place to begin regional cooperation in land-based pollution control.
Unlike the Mediterranean states, the parties to the Paris Convention are all highly-developed
countries. Moreover, unlike the Baltic and Mediterranean negotiators, the Paris Convention
drafters did not face the political obstacles that threatened to undermine cooperation in the
other two regions. These differences help explain the variations between the resulting agree-
ments.
24. See notes 103-37 supra and accompanying text.
25. In the final analysis, the waters of the earth are finite; even the oceans are enclosed. R.
HALLMAN, supra note 15, at 8. Moreover, numerous regional successes may facilitate the de-
velopment of a global control scheme. The problem would be one of coordinating regional
efforts. See Bilder, The Consequences of Regionalization in the Treaty and Customary Law of
the Sea, in REGIONALIZATION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 31, 34 (D. Johnston ed. 1978).
26. See A. Kiss, supra note 8, at 67-68.
27. Openedfor signature June 4, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 352 (1974)
(in force May 6, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Paris Convention].
Significant features of the agreement include the establishment of a special commission to
oversee implementation, id. arts. 15-16, a provision obligating parties to punish domestic land-
based polluters, id. art. 12, and a detailed arbitration provision, id. art. 21, Annex b. See Com-
ment, The Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources: A4n
Effective Methodfor Arbitrating International Effluent Pollution Disputes, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
350 (1975). The Convention fails, however, to deal with bacterial pollutants or airborne pollu-
tion, important land-based sources of marine pollution. See note 77 infra and accompanying
text.
28. Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 2.
29. Fourteen nations attended the conference: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 352
(1974). The parties are basically the same as those to the Convention for the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, done Feb. 15, 1972, reprinted in 11
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 262 (1972).
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fication and, on May 6, 1978, the Paris Convention became the first land-
based pollution agreement to enter into force. 30
The Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Baltic Sea Area (Baltic Convention) emerged from a 1974 Helsinki confer-
ence that assembled representatives of seven Baltic littoral states.3' The
Baltic Convention is an ambitious attempt to consider al marine pollution
sources in a single document.32 As a model for transnational environmen-
tal agreements, the Baltic accord is especially valuable because it brings
together members of opposing political and military blocs. 33
B. LAND-BASED POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
REGION
The Mediterranean Sea has been the ultimate receptacle of man's
wastes since the appearance of civilization along its shores. 34 In the past
century, however, the volume of discharged wastes began to surpass the
30. 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 549 (1979). The first seven parties to ratify the agreement
were Belgium, Denmark, the European Economic Community, France, Norway, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. Id.
31. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, in
force May 3, 1980, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 546 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Baltic Convention]. Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Dem-
ocratic Republic, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Sweden signed the Baltic Convention. 13
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, 555 (1974). See also [1980] INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 231-32.
By early 1980, six of the seven Baltic states had ratified the agreement. The Federal Repub-
lic of Germany announced its intention to deposit its ratification with the depository Finnish
government in Feburary, 1980. Interview with Consul Sakari Nurmi of Finland (Feb. 5,
1980). Political problems, stemming in part from conflicts between the two Republics of Ger-
many, were largely responsible for the postponement of the document's entry into force until
May, 1980. See Goralczyk, La Mer Baltique et Les Probltmes de Cooperation des Etats River-
ains, 84 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 269, 279 (1980). In addition,
economic and technological problems, as well as the need to adjust existing national legislation
to the language of the Convention, have contributed to the delay. Boczek, InternationalProtec-
tion ofthe Baltic Sea Environment 4gainst Pollution: .4 Study in Marine Regionalism, 72 AM. J.
INT'L L. 782, 813 (1978).
32. The Baltic Convention deals with pollution by ships, Baltic Convention, supra note 31,
art. 7; dumping, id. art. 9; land-based sources, id. art. 6; and exploitation of the seabed, id. art
10. The agreement also refers specifically to airborne pollution, id. art. 5, and provides for the
establishment of the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission, id. art. 12.
33. Serious political differences encumbered the Baltic negotiations. The participating
parties include three Warsaw Pact nations (U.S.S.R., Poland and East Germany), two mem-
bers of NATO (Denmark and West Germany), and two nonaligned western democracies (Fin-
land and Sweden). See generally Alexander, note 21 supra;, Johnson, The Baltic Conventions,
25 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 1 (1976); Lundhohn, The Oceans-Their Production and Pollution. The
Baltic as a Case Study, in PACEM IN MARIBUS 25 (E. Borgese ed. 1972).
34. See Ritchie-Calder, The Pollution ofthe Mediterranean, in THE TIDES OF CHANGE:
PEACE, POLLUTION, AND THE POTENTIAL OF THE OCEANS 144, 149 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
THE TIDES OF CHANGE].
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marine environment's absorptive capacity, 35 prompting environmentalists
to warn of impending ecological disaster.36
Because the Mediterranean is an almost totally enclosed ecosystem, 37
its marine environment is especially fragile. 38 A total transfer of water
through the Straits of Gibralter takes about eighty years; therefore, the
Mediterranean is unable to cleanse itself by mixing with the open seas.39
Moreover, the Mediterranean's relatively warm average water tempera-
ture4o makes it particularly susceptible to microbacterial pollution, which
already constitutes the most serious threat to human health in the region. 4'
Four major factors are responsible for environmental decay in the
Mediterranean. First, the construction of waste treatment facilities has
failed to keep pace with rapid population growth in coastal areas. 42 An
estimated eighty percent of Mediterranean coastal cities' sewage enters the
marine environment inadequately treated or not treated at all.43 Second,
35. If kept within the limits of their absorptive capacity, waste disposal is a legitimate use
of the seas. Industrial development would not have been possible had the ocean been unavail-
able for waste disposal. Effective land-based pollution control does not require the elimination
of all wastes from the oceans. Rather, the problem is one of balancing the needs of industry
with environmental concerns supported by detailed scientific knowledge. See S. ODA, supra
note 14, at 214-15; Hood, Introduction: Man and the Ocean Environment, in IMPINGEMENT OF
MAN ON THE OCEANS 1, 2-5 (1971).
36. See authorities cited in note 35 supra.
37. "The Mediterranean is a sick sea. Unless rather drastic steps are taken in the near
future, it may become a dead sea." THE TIDES OF CHANGE, supra note 34, at 142. See Sand,
Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution in the Mediterranean, I ENvr'L POL'Y
& L. 154 (1976).
38. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
39. For a discussion of the mixing phenomenon, see Okubo, Horizontal and Vertical Mix.
ing in the Sea, in IMPINGEMENT OF MAN ON THE OCEANS 89 (1971).
40. The high water temperature in the area facilitates the existence of micro-bacteria that
require oxygen to live. This increased biological oxygen demand is a primary cause of
eutrophication in the Mediterranean. A different problem exists in the Baltic, where the dis-
charge of phosphates is the primary cause of eutrophication. Bacterial pollution is not as great
a problem in the Baltic as in the Mediterranean because of the Baltic's comparatively cold
waters. See Boczek, supra note 31, at 787, 792.
41. The problem of micro-bacterial pollution already has serious implications for the
Mediterranean tourist trade. According to one British study, the health of one in seven bathers
in Mediterranean waters is adversely affected by the pollution. Newsweek, Sept. 3, 1979, at 47.
For a general discussion of oceanic bacterial pollution, see Gauthier, Les Pollutions Bacterien-
nes en Milieu Marin, in LA POLLUTION DES EAUX MARINES 117 (J.-M. Peres ed. 1976).
42. About 100 million people now live permanently along the Mediterranean coasts. It is
estimated that some 200 million people will live in Mediterranean coastal cities by the year
2000. Population increases have led to severe pollution in coastal areas because of a lack of
rational urban planning. [1979] INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 926. One expert estimated that 70
to 80% of all Italian coastal cities are still dumping untreated urban wastes into the Mediterra-
nean at the rate of 800,000 tons annually. [1979] INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 860.
43. 10 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 346 (1979). For a detailed discussion of the effects of
discharged sewage on the marine environment, see Topping, Sewage and the Sea, in MARINE
POLLUTION 303 (R. Johnston ed. 1976).
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an ever-increasing number of tourists flock to Mediterranean beaches each
year, increasing the burden on already inadequate sewage treatment
plants.44 Third, significant industrial expansion, primarily along the
French, Spanish, and Italian coasts, 45 has resulted in heightened concentra-
tions of heavy and light metals and other toxic substances in the water.46
Finally, intensified agricultural production necessitated the use of fertilizers
and pesticides, many of which enter the marine environment by way of the
atmosphere. 47
The governments of the Mediterranean littoral states ignored this pol-
lution problem until the water quality began affecting the sea's users. 48
When unilateral domestic regulation proved inadequate to reverse the trend
toward destruction of the sea, the need for transnational cooperation be-
came apparent. 49 Organizing collective action was not a simple task, how-
ever, as sharp political disputes among the eighteen Mediterranean coastal
states threatened to preclude any type of multilateral cooperation. 50
Economic, not political differences among the countries, however, were
the most serious impediment to the adoption of a Mediterranean pollution
44. The annual number of tourists in the region more than doubled from 1960 to 1970 and
more than 100 million people now visit the Mediterranean each year. 10 MARINE POLLUTION
BULL. 346 (1979). Transformation of coastal areas to accommodate massive numbers of tour-
ists has greatly contributed to the Mediterranean land-based pollution problem. Increased
seasonal population increases the burden of treating human wastes at inadequate facilities.
See Gonen, Mediterranean Tourism: Some Geographic Perspectives, in THE TIDES OF
CHANGE, supra note 34, at 195.
45. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1977, at 3, col. 4.
46. Annual pollution levels of heavy and light metals in the Mediterranean include 100
tons of mercury, 3,800 tons of lead, and 21,000 tons of zinc. Newsweek, Sept. 3, 1979, at 47.
The effects of metals discharged into the sea are discussed in Bryan, Heavy Metal Contamina-
lion in the Sea, in MARINE POLLUTION, supra note 43, at 185.
47. Since they enter the sea through run-off or the atmosphere, these sources of pollution
are especially difficult to control. DDT has posed the most serious pesticide problem. Experts
estimate that as much as 25% of all DDT produced to date may have already entered the
marine environment. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CHLORINATED HYDROCARBONS IN
THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 1 (1971). A related problem is the alarming increase in carbon
dioxide levels in the Mediterranean caused by increased reliance on fossil fuels. See Ritchie-
Calder, supra note 34, at 152-53.
48. See Report of the Intergovernmental Review Meeting of Mediterranean Coastal
States and First Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution and its Related Protocols, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.14/9
(1979), Annex iv, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Intergovernmental Meeting Report].
49. The Italian government's inability to implement domestic controls on sewage disposal
exemplifies the problem. See note 42 supra. For a review of domestic European environmen-
tal legislation, see S. ERCMAN, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL (1977).
50. Examples of past and present political conflicts in the region include the Israeli-Arab,
Greek-Turkish, Algerian-Moroccan, and Libyan-Egyptian disputes.
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control agreement.5 ' The developing nations of the southern and eastern
shores52 felt that the developed countries, as the biggest polluters in the
region, 53 should pay the lion's share of program costs. Furthermore, the
developing states indicated that they might refuse to accept stringent pollu-
tion control standards because the cost of compliance might prevent them
from reaching the stage of industrial development that the richer nations
had attained, in part, through pollution.5 4
In 1975, the Mediterranean littoral states finally overcame their politi-
cal and economic differences and joined forces to save their contaminated
sea. The result was the Mediterranean Action Plan,55 which envisioned a
massive transnational clean-up effort under the auspices of the United
Nations Environment Program (UNEP).56 One year later, representatives
of fifteen Mediterranean states signed the Barcelona Convention 57 and its
related Protocols on Dumping58 and Emergencies. 59 Under the Barcelona
Convention, in force since early 1978, the Mediterranean nations have
made considerable progress, particularly in scientific assessment of the
Mediterranean pollution problem.60
The Barcelona Convention, however, lacks provisions regulating the
most important sources of Mediterranean marine pollution-man's land-
based activities.6 1 Article 8 of the Barcelona accord broadly outlines the
5 1. There are enormous economic differences between the rich and poor nations in the
region. In 1977, for example, France had nearly twenty-five times the industrial output of
Morocco, Libya, and Algeria combined. See Johnson, Regionalism and the Law of the Sea:
New Aspects of Dominance and Dependency, in REGIONALIZATION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
103, 124 (D. Johnston ed. 1978).
52. For the purposes of this Note, "northern countries" refers only to Italy, France, and
Spain. These three nations are far more developed than any of the other Mediterranean litto-
ral nations, referred to here as "southern and eastern states." Id.
53. See [1978] INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 26.
54. Id. at 25-26; see note 15 supra and accompanying text.
55. Action Plan for the Mediterranean, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 475
(1975).
56. UNEP and its world-wide environmental efforts are discussed in Hardy, The United
Nations Environment Program, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 12, at
57; Note, The Challenge of International Environmental Management: A Critique of the United
Nations Environment Programme, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 269 (1978).
57. Barcelona Convention, note 4 supra.
58. Protocol on Dumping, note 4 supra.
59. Protocol on Emergencies, note 4 supra.
60. Under the direction of the Action Plan, scientists have carried out extensive research
in the hope of assessing the extent of pollution damage in the Mediterranean. The two major
scientific programs are the co-ordinated Mediterranean Pollution Monitoring and Research
Programme (MED POL), and the "Blue Plan." This research has demonstrated conclusively
that the Mediterranean Sea is highly polluted and that urgent action is required to prevent
further deterioration of the marine environment. See generally Intergovernmental Meeting
Report, note 48 supra.
61. 10 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 346 (1979).
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need for land-based pollution control,62 and the parties envisioned a special
protocol on the subject from the beginning.
Less than one year after the adoption of the Barcelona Convention,
representatives of sixteen Mediterranean states assembled to discuss the
problem of land-based pollution.63 Over the next two years, however, a
funding dispute marred the meetings of technical and legal experts on land-
based pollution.64 The continuing rift between developed and developing
nations concerning distribution of program costs not only blocked the nego-
tiation of a land-based pollution protocol, but also threatened to undermine
the effective implementation of the Mediterranean Action Plan.65
In early 1979, the negotiation of a new funding scheme helped clear
the way for the conclusion of an agreement on land-based sources. 66 Under
62. The agreement provides, "mhe Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate meas-
ures to prevent, abate and combat pollution of the Mediterranean Sea Area caused by dis-
charges from rivers, coastal establishments or out falls, or emanating from any other land-
based sources within their territories." Barcelona Convention, supra note 4, art. 8.
63. The first meeting of legal and technical experts on land-based pollution took place in
Athens in February, 1977. United Nations Environment Program: Report on Draft Protocol
for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/IG. 6/6 (1977), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 958 (1978). Experts at
the Athens meeting agreed to many broad principles, id. at 964-69, but disagreed on such
fundamental questions as the inclusion of airborne pollutants within the Protocol's scope,
assistance to developing countries, and the application of different pollution standards to
existing sources and new installations. Id. at 961-62.
By their October, 1977 meeting in Venice, the negotiators had begun drafting a protocol on
land-based sources, and officials were optimistic that an accord could be signed in 1978. [1978]
INT'L ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 16.
64. In January, 1978, all the Mediterranean littoral states except Albania participated in a
Monte Carlo meeting that officials hoped would lead to completion of a protocol on land-
based sources. The meeting was far from successful, however, and the gap between developed
and developing countries widened. The experts reconvened in Geneva in October, 1978, but
again failed to reach a compromise. The question of payment of program costs remained
unresolved. It seemed unlikely, therefore, that the parties could agree on even more costly
land-based pollution measures. See [1978] INT'L ENvip. REP. (BNA) 16-17, 25-26, 60, 96.
65. See notes 66-67 infra and accompanying text. In early 1979, the entire Mediterranean
Action Plan was in deep trouble. UNEP had announced that it would be unable to continue
contributing funds to the extent that it had in the past ($7.5 million by early 1979). Moreover,
the Mediterranean states had been unable at previous meetings to agree upon an appropriate
distribution of costs. In early 1979, therefore, it appeared that the Action Plan might not even
have sufficient funds to continue its programs through 1979. [1979] INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA)
507. See also United Nations Environment Programme: Report of the Governing Council on
the Work of its Sixth Session, 33 U.N. GAOR, supp. (No. 25) 114, 139-40, U.N. Doc. A/33/25
(1978).
66. Facing the possibility that the Action Plan's funds would expire, representatives of all
the Mediterranean coastal states except Albania met in Geneva in Feburary, 1979. The result
of this Intergovernmental Review Meeting was the creation of the Mediterranean Regional
Trust Fund, which will provide $6.4 million to fund the Action Plan through 1980. UNEP
attended and agreed to contribute $1.6 million, but expressed the hope that the program would
be entirely self-supporting by 1983.
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the rules of the Mediterranean Regional Trust Fund, the developed nations
agreed to contribute nearly eighty-five percent of the government funds
required for implementation of the Action Plan for the following two
years.67 The funding agreement guarantees financing through 1981 and,
more importantly, shows the willingness of the developed nations to bear
the primary financial burden of pollution control.
68
With the funding issue settled, technical and legal experts met again in
1979.69 Motivated by severe and continuing environmental decay in the
Mediterranean, primarily a result of continuing effluent pollution, the
experts concluded an acceptable draft agreement. On June 26, 1979, repre-
sentatives from fourteen of the eighteen Mediterranean littoral states agreed
to this draft.70 Pursuant to article 15 of the Barcelona Convention, the
Mediterranean states held a diplomatic conference in Athens on May 12-16,
1980, for the formal adoption of the Protocol.7 t Only Albania, Egypt, and
the Syrian Arab Republic did not participate in the Athens conference. 72
The Athens negotiators were successful, and the conference formally
adopted the new Protocol on May 17, 1980.73 Twelve states and the Euro-
pean Economic Community have since signed the agreement. 74
II
THE MEDITERRANEAN
PROTOCOL ON LAND-BASED SOURCES
The language of the Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources
indicates that the negotiators sought to strike a balance between a broad
statement of unattainable goals and a narrow, over-technical document that
the parties might be hesitant to sign. While the drafters clearly announced
their objectives and proposed methods for reducing land-based pollution,
67. Intergovernmental Meeting Report, supra note 48, annex VIII.
68. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
69. Albania, Syria, Cyprus, and Algeria did not send representatives to this June, 1979
meeting in Geneva. [1979] INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 793.
70. United Nations Environment Programme Preliminary Draft Protocol for the Protec-
tion of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, reprintedin [1979]
INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 818 [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Draft Protocol on Land-Based
Sources].
71. See Final Act, Conference of Plenipotentiaries of the Coastal States of the Mediterra-
nean Sea Region for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from Land-
Based Sources 1980 (on file at the Cornell International Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as
Final Act).
72. Id.
73. The conference participants unanimously adopted the new Protocol, and only the
Turkish government expressed any reservations to the text. Turkey's reservations to articles
3(b) & (c), 4, 5, 6, 12(2) and 13(2) were included in the Final Act, note 71 supra.
74. See [19801 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 230.
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they left the development of precise standards and timetables to future
amendments, annexes, and protocols.7 5
The scope of the Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources is
broad. Article 4 indicates that the Protocol applies to both direct effluent
pollution from coastal establishments and indirect discharges into the sea
through rivers, canals, and run-off.76 Furthermore, the agreement expressly
applies to pollutants entering the marine environment through the atmos-
phere.77 Moreover, unlike the Barcelona Convention,78 the Protocol
applies to the internal coastal waters of the parties. 79
The Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources uses the "black
list/grey list" approach to describe pollutants.80 The Oslo Dumping Con-
vention of 197281 established this method, which also appears in both the
Paris and Baltic Conventions.8 2 Like its counterparts, the Mediterranean
Protocol calls for the issuance of "authorization[s]" that "strictly limit" the
discharge of substances on the grey list.83 Annex III sets forth a detailed list
75. See, e.g., Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, arts. 4-6. The
Baltic negotiators took a similar approach, which led one commentator to state:
This is an excellent way of building a convention. Experience shows that it is difficult
or even impossible to change the provisions of a convention once it has already been
adopted and ratified. . . New hazardous activities and new noxious substances can
thus be included in the Annexes without undue delay.
Johnson, The Ba/lic Conventions, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 7 (1976).
76. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 4(1). The inclusion
of non-point sources indicates the drafters' ambitious approach. Unlike capital-intensive con-
trol of point sources, control of non-point sources raises complex questions of land-use plan-
ning and local waste water treatment. See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLIcY 475 (2d ed. 1978).
77. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 4(l)(b). Airborne
pollution, accounting for a high percentage of all marine pollution, is an exceedingly complex
problem. Some airborne pollutants fall with rain into the sea, while others enter the marine
environment through a complex process of interaction between air and water. This latter proc-
ess is a major concern of scientists, who fear that marine pollution may impair the transfer of
oxygen. The oceans supply about 70% of the earth's oxygen. See Mordy & Mordy, Atmos-
pheric Control and the Ocean Regime, in PACEM IN MARIBuS 42, 51-53 (E. Borgese ed. 1972);
Marstrand, Pollution of the Seas, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION CONTROL 150, 152 (1974).
78. See Barcelona Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(2).
79. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 3(b).
80. Id. arts. 5, 6, annexes I, II. The black list includes certain heavy metals such as mer-
cury and cadmium, organohalogens and organophosphorus substances (D.D.T. and P.C.B.'s),
carcinogenic matter, and other extremely toxic substances. Id. annex I. The grey list names
most other heavy and light metals, biocides, pathogenic micro-organisms, phosphates, thermal
pollutants, and any other substances that have a deleterious effect on the marine environment.
The list includes those substances affecting the oxygen balance in the water. Id. annex. II.
8 1. See Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and
Aircraft, supra note 29, arts. 5, 6.
82. Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 4, annex A; Baltic Convention, supra note 31,
arts. 5, 6, annexes I, IL
83. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 6; Baltic Conven-
tion, supra note 31, art. 6; Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 4(2).
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of factors that national authorities may consider in establishing permit cri-
teria.84 The agreement, however, will subject grey list substances to "strict
measures" designed to completely eliminate their discharge.8 5
Under article 8, the Mediterranean nations agree to cooperate in an
extensive effort to monitor the extent and continuing levels of pollution
from land-based sources.86 The Protocol also calls for cooperation in the
areas of scientific and technical training and assistance, with recognition of
the special needs of developing countries. 87
Like the Paris and Baltic accords, the Mediterranean Protocol does not
outline a standard of liability for land-based pollution damage.8 8 It does,
however, propose certain measures when one state's pollution affects
another state,89 and when pollution threatens "a watercourse which flows
through the territories of two or more parties."90
84. National authorities are to consider five major factors in formulating standards for
grey list discharges:
A. Characteristics and composition of the waste
B. Characteristics of waste constituents with respect to their harmfulness
C. Characteristics of discharge site and receiving marine environment
D. Availability of waste treatment technology
E. Potential impairment of marine ecosystems and sea water uses ....
Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, annex III.
85. Id. art. 6, annex I.
86. Id. art. 8.
87. Id. arts. 9, 10.
88. The Baltic Convention provides:
The Contracting Parties undertake, as soon as possible, jointly to develop and accept
rules concerning responsibility for damage resulting from acts or omissions in contra-
vention of the present Convention, including, inter alia, limits of responsibility, crite-
ria and procedures for the determination of liability and available remedies.
Baltic Convention, supra note 31, art. 17.
The Barcelona Convention contains a provision similar to that of the Baltic Convention.
See Barcelona Convention, supra note 4, art. 12. Studies are presently underway to determine
the feasibility of a Mediterranean interstate guarantee fund to compensate parties injured by
marine pollution. Liability for damage may be the subject of a separate protocol in the future.
Intergovernmental Meeting Report, supra note 48, at 14-15.
89. Under such circumstances, the parties "undertake to enter into consultation with a
view to seeking a satisfactory solution." Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources,
supra note 6, art. 12(1). Furthermore, any concerned party may raise the matter at a meeting
of the parties to the Protocol. Id. art. 12(2).
90. Id. art. 11. See notes 115-20 infra and accompanying text.
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III
ANALYSIS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
PROTOCOL ON LAND-BASED SOURCES
A. POSITIVE FEATURES
Differences between rich and poor nations constitute the primary
impediment to international environmental protection.9 1 The most signifi-
cant aspect of the Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, there-
fore, lies in the negotiators' success in obtaining any agreement. The
regional approach to the problem certainly facilitated the negotiating proc-
ess.92 Nevertheless, by overcoming the political and economic differences
of the parties, the drafters have successfully dealt with the same problems
that arise at the global level. 93 Focusing on the negotiating process, there-
fore, the Protocol stands as a model for international environmental coop-
eration among developing and developed countries.
Due to the economic-political character of the region, the Mediterra-
nean representatives faced difficult issues not present in the Paris and Baltic
negotiations. 94 To obtain the all-important approval of the developing
nations, the Protocol includes numerous provisions reflecting concern for
the interests of these countries. Most notably, article 7 requires that the
acceptable pollution levels for grey list substances reflect the economic in-
terests of the parties to whom they apply.95 Under this approach, very dif-
ferent pollution control criteria may apply to nations in close geographic
proximity.
A further encouraging result of the drafters' compromise is article 10,
in which the contracting parties promise to promote "programmes of assist-
ance to developing countries."'96 Unique to the Mediterranean accord, the
article calls for the establishment of personnel training programs, as well as
aid to developing parties for the acquisition, production, and use of pollu-
91. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
93. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
94. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
95. The provision states, in pertinent part, "Without prejudice to the provisions of article 5
of this Protocol, such common guidelines, standards or criteria shall take into account ... the
economic capacity of the Parties and their need for development. Mediterranean Proto-
col on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 7(2).
A blanket provision applicable to all criteria and recommended practices, see id. art. 7(l),
article 7(2) responds directly to the economic concerns of developing states. Though not creat-
ing a right to pollute, the provision does ensure that standards suited to the economies of
France, Italy, or Spain will not apply to the developing nations of the southern and eastern
shores.
96. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 10(l).
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tion control equipment.9 7 Article 10 purports to place the primary financial
burden of all aspects of the land-based pollution fight on the developed
Mediterranean states by requiring assistance to be provided to the develop-
ing countries "on advantageous terms."'98
The Protocol relies on UNEP to perform secretariat and organizational
functions.99 The document also permits competent transnational groups to
become signatories to the Protocol.' °° By including the participation of in-
ternational organizations, the land-based pollution program will benefit
from the financial and informational assets of these groups. to' Further-
more, these groups may provide mediation services when disputes arise, an
important concern in the conflict-ridden Mediterranean region. Finally, the
participation of international organizations will help to ensure that more
than purely national interests will influence the formulation of land-based
pollution standards for the Mediterranean.
B. DEFICIENCIES IN THE DRAFT PROTOCOL AND SUGGESTED
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
The objective of the Mediterranean Protocol is "to prevent, abate,
combat and control" land-based pollution.10 2 Given the value of the Proto-
col as a compromise between rich and poor nations, the question remains as
to the potential effectiveness of the agreement. Since a correlation exists
between the number of interests that must be accommodated and the result-
ing rights and obligations of the parties, the compromise has serious impli-
cations respecting the Protocol's future effectiveness. The comparative
analysis that follows considers the Mediterranean Protocol in light of the
Baltic and Paris Conventions, where the negotiators did not face the prob-
lem of reconciling the conflicting interests of environmental protection and
economic development.
97. Id. art. 10(2).
98. Id.
99. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 2; Barcelona Con-
vention, supra note 4, art. 13.
100. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 16(3).
101. The most important of these groups is the European Economic Community. The EEC
is already a party to the Barcelona Convention and has agreed to contribute to the Mediterra-
nean Regional Trust Fund. Intergovernmental Meeting Report, supra note 48, annex VIII.
Conversely, participation in environmental conventions benefits the international organiza-
tion. Because of the benefits it receives in the form of increased legal personality, the EEC
hopes to become a party to an eventual convention on the Law of the Sea. See Koers, Partici-
pation of the European Economic Community in a New Law of the Sea Convention, 73 AM. J.
INT'L L. 426 (1979).
102. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 1.
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Broadness of language concerning the rights and duties of the parties is
a liability of the Protocol. This textual deficiency is apparent in the agree-
ment's opening paragraph, in which the parties agree to take "all appropri-
ate measures" against land-based pollution. 10 3 Furthermore, the parties
merely agree to "endeavour" to give effect to articles 9 and 11(2). 104 Non-
binding language of this type encourages the participation of developing
nations that might refuse to sign a more narrowly-drawn document.'0 5 Un-
fortunately, such language may also offer an escape route for governments
that do not wish to comply with pollution standards. Perhaps because of
the political heterogeneity of the region, the Baltic Convention also speaks
of "appropriate measures." 0 6 Covering a more harmonious political and
economic region, the Paris Convention offers a preferable alternative by
requiring "all possible steps to prevent pollution of the sea."'10 7
Similarly, both the Mediterranean Protocol and the Baltic Convention
contain deficient provisions regarding enforcement of standards against
polluting private citizens. Unlike the Paris Convention, neither agreement
imposes a definitive duty "to punish conduct in contravention of the provi-
sions of the present Convention."10 8 Such a duty may be implied from the
duty to take "appropriate measures" but, again, this language is probably
too vague to be effective.' 09
All three land-based pollution agreements rely on affected contracting
parties to enforce the obligations undertaken by other parties. None of the
agreements provide for the establishment of an independent enforcement
agency. Actions against violators, therefore, will occur only if a party as-
serts damage to its interests.
Concerning dispute settlement, the Mediterranean Protocol's require-
ment that parties "undertake to enter into consultation' 'o is an insufficient
method of protecting party rights. As with consultations under the Baltic
Convention,"1 ' the failure of negotiations between parties to yield a solu-
103. Id.
104. Id. arts. 9, 11. For discussions of the inadequacy of this type of convention language,
see SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 1ST SEss., EFFECTS OF MAN'S ACTIVITIES
ON THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 38 (Comm. Print 1975); R. HALLMAN, supra note 15, at 42-43.
105. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
106. 1974 Baltic Convention, supra note 31, arts. 3(1), 6.
107. 1974 Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 1(1).
108. Id. art. 12(1).
109. See notes 103-07 supra and accompanying text.
110. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 12.
111. The paradoxical language of the Baltic Convention first directs parties to negotiate
and then seek mediation by a third contracting party. The convention thereafter provides:
If the parties concerned have not been able to resolve their disputes through negotia-
tion or have been unable to agree on measures as described above, such disputes shall
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tion will lead to arbitration only "upon common agreement.""t 2 In con-
trast, the Paris Convention provides for binding arbitration at any party's
request." 13 A deficiency of all three conventions, however, is the failure to
define adequately the nature of a party's responsibility for harm caused by
its land-based pollution.' '4
Article 11 of the Mediterranean Protocol, which covers watercourses
shared by several states," 15 is potentially problematic due to the Mediterra-
nean's geography."16 When two parties share a watercourse, the Protocol
requires them to endeavor "to enter into consultation" if pollution disputes
arise' 17 When a nonparty is involved, however, the Protocol merely pre-
vents the nonparty from invoking the agreement." 18 The Baltic agreement
does not even address this problem, but the Paris Convention again sug-
gests a possible approach. The Paris Convention requires a contracting
state to "endeavour to cooperate with the non-contracting state" to prevent
upstream pollution."19 Alternatively, the Mediterranean drafters might
have required the OrganizationI 20 to negotiate with polluting nonparties.
be, upon common agreement, submitted to ad-hoc arbitration tribunal, to a permanent
arbitration tribunal, or the International Court of Justice.
Baltic Convention, supra note 31, art. 18, (emphasis added). Parties unable to agree on media-
tion would be unlikely to submit a dispute to binding arbitration. See Boczek, supra note 31,
at 810.
112. Barcelona Convention, supra note 4, art. 22.
113. Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 21. The Paris accord also establishes an arbitral
procedure for use in such instances. Id. annex B. See also Barcelona Convention, supra note
4, annex A.
114. Although all three agreements imply that parties are liable for pollution originating in
their territories, none of the accords specify whether the liability is strict or based upon fault.
Moreover, the agreements do not provide for compensation or other remedies. See note 88
supra and accompanying text. For a more direct, though simplistic, approach to the problem,
see Draft Articles on Marine Pollution of Continental Origin, art. V, INTERNATIONAL LAW
ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIFTH CONFERENCE 98, 104 (1974).
115. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 11.
116. For a general discussion of the present state of international law concerning transna-
tional rivers and lakes, see Dickstein, International Lake andRiver Pollution Control Questions
and Method, 12 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 487 (1973).
117. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 12(1).
118. Id. art. 11(2). Problems of upstream pollution by nonparties are most likely to arise
along the Nile, the Mediterranean's most important source of fresh water, and the Rhone. The
Nile flows through eight developing nations of northern Africa before emptying into the Medi-
terranean. Ritchie-Calder, supra note 34, at 150-51. Moreover, man's activities along the Nile
have already had serious effects on the Mediterranean marine environment. Once the source
of 30% of all fresh water emptying into the Mediterranean, the Nile flows at about one-tenth of
its former level since construction of the Aswan Dam. Damage to the delta region and to the
entire eastern Mediterranean has already occurred, but the long-term effects are unknown. 4
PROCEEDINGS PACEM IN MARIBUS CONVOCATION, note 124 infra, at 168-69 (statement of Dr.
Neil Hulings).
119. Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 14(2).
120. "Organization" presently refers simply to UNEP in its secretariat role. See note 99
supra and accompanying text. Dispute mediation could also be one of the functions of a
LAND-BASED POLLUTION
The acceptable pollution level concept governing grey list discharges
under the Mediterranean Protocol is the agreement's primary attraction to
the developing countries.' 2 1 Nonetheless, the concept could create difficul-
ties. The lack of a nondegradation provision will tempt nations to allow
existing pollution levels to rise to the acceptable level in order to derive the
maximum economic benefit of pollution. The end result of such an
approach is to permit discharges that existing technology could prevent.
Rather than forcing the Mediterranean Protocol's basic purpose of prevent-
ing pollution to yield to the economic interests of the developing nations, a
better approach would be to set a single standard applicable to all countries.
To accommodate the developing nations, the developed nations might help
pay for the required pollution control technology.' 22
Two especially interesting provisions of the Preliminary Draft Proto-
col 2 3 were deleted at the Athens meeting and do not appear in the final
Protocol. Article 10 of the Preliminary Draft Protocol called for special
protection of particularly vulnerable areas of the marine environment.' 24
Ecologically fragile areas such as estuaries and lagoons would have been
designated as transnational marine parks to which special pollution stan-
dards would apply.'2 5 This important area for transnational cooperation
would certainly be an appropriate subject for an additional protocol. The
second significant deletion of the Athens negotiators involved the Prelimi-
nary Draft Protocol's distinction between "existing sources" and "new in-
stallations."1 26 The Preliminary Draft Protocol called for formulation of a
Mediterranean land-based pollution commission. See notes 134-37 infra and accompanying
text.
121. See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
122. Such a financial commitment may presently be too much to ask of the developed na-
tions. In a perfect economic model, however, the benefits of reduced pollution would equal
the expenditutes for pollution control. Unfortunately, the sea's recreational value, reduced
health care costs to coastal inhabitants, and other social benefits of pollution control are diffi-
cult to quantify, and do not often enter into governmental budgetary decisions. See Mar-
strand, Pollution ofInland Waters, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION CONTROL 88, 95 (1974);
Stewart, Pyramids of SacrXce? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 n. 66 (1977).
123. Preliminary Draft Protocol on Land-Based Sources, note 70 supra.
124. Id. art. 10. See generally 4 PROCEEDINGS PACEM IN MARIBUS CONVOCATION 182-91
(D. Krieger ed. 1974).
125. These areas merit special protection, because they often provide the habitat for rare
species of wildlife. For a discussion of the ecological fragility of such marine areas, see gener-
ally POLLUTION CRITERIA FOR ESTUARIES (J. Bossanyi & P.R. Helliwell ed. 1975); THE
WATER'S EDGE: CRITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE COASTAL ZONE (B. Ketchem ed. 1972).
During the Ixtoc I oil spill, note 12 supra, a major fear of ecologists was that oil would reach
Laguna Madrea. This ecologically unique bay provides the habitat for such endangered spe-
cies as the Kemp's Ridley Sea Turtle and the Brown Pelican. [1979] INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA)
798, 841.
126. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, arts. 5, 6.
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timetable to progressively reduce discharges from existing sources, while
installations established after the document's entry into force were not to
"interfere with any existing or foreseeable legitimate uses.' 27 Articles 5
and 6 of the Preliminary Draft Protocol would have introduced a concept
unique to the Mediterranean accord, and it is unfortunate that the Athens
negotiators decided to eliminate these provisions in the final text.
Perhaps the most significant change made at the Athens meeting, how-
ever, involves the final Protocol's treatment of off-shore structures under a
party's jurisdiction. 128 This coverage is especially important because of in-
creasing exploration and exploitation of the Mediterranean continental
shelf.' 29 The Protocol as adopted, however, applies only to fixed off-shore
structures "which serve purposes other than exploration and exploitation of
mineral resources,"' 30 thus leaving uncontrolled the vast majority of such
structures.
The elimination of standards for off-shore structures used for mineral
exploitation is unfortunate. By including these structures in its coverage,
the Protocol would have implied that contracting states are responsible for
the actions of off-shore polluters, a question far from settled under custom-
ary international law.' 3 ' Moreover, because the Baltic and Paris Conven-
tions cover all off-shore installations, 32 the Preliminary Draft Protocol
provision might have offered further evidence of emerging state practice or
opinio juris, two of the processes by which international custom devel-
ops. 133
Finally, the Protocol negotiators failed to establish a special commis-
sion to monitor land-based pollution and to implement the plan. 134 The
Baltic Convention provides for such a body,135 and the Paris Convention
127. Id. art. 6. Notable "existing or foreseeable legitimate uses" include fishing and recrea-
tion. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
128. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 4(2).
129. Intergovernmental Meeting Report, supra note 48, at 14. Safety practices and stan-
dards governing Mediterranean off-shore exploitation of the seabed are currently left to pri-
vate operators. Id.
130. Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources, supra note 6, art. 4(2).
131. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
132. Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 3(c)(iii); Baltic Convention, supra note 31, art. 10.
The Baltic Convention is the most stringent, requiring the party under whose jurisdiction off-
shore activities are taking place to "ensure that adequate equipment is at hand to start an
immediate abatement of pollution in that area." Id.
133. See G. TIMAGENIS, THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE POLLUTION 54 (1980).
Cf. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.: The Seventh Session
(1978), 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 38 (1979) (negotiating text of conference may be a guide to state
practice and opiniojuris).
134. Therefore, all decisions must presently be made at meetings of the parties held every
two years. See Barcelona Convention, supra note 4, arts. 13-14.
135. Baltic Convention, supra note 31, art. 12.
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establishes a commission with broad powers. 136 As secretariat, UNEP will
play a beneficial role in the immediate future of the Protocol. 37 In the long
run, however, a special commission might be desirable for several reasons.
The commissioners could meet during the two-:year interval between official
meetings of the parties. Moreover, this approach might foster the develop-
ment of regional expertise in specific Mediterranean pollution problems,
and might promote the program's own self-sufficiency. Finally, the com-
mission might supply the infrastructure for a judicial or arbitral body to
settle complex land-based pollution disputes.
CONCLUSION
Given the severity of land-based transnational marine pollution and
the inconclusive state of customary international law on the issue, multilat-
eral treaties at the regional level may offer the only feasible solution to the
problem. Compared with similar agreements covering the Baltic and North
Seas, the Mediterranean Protocol on Land-Based Sources is laden with tex-
tual deficiencies resulting from an attempt to reconcile numerous conflict-
ing interests. The success of the plan, therefore, will ultimately depend on
the Mediterranean states and their willingness to carry out the Protocol's
objectives.
Though not the final answer to Mediterranean land-based pollution,
the Protocol is a first step. Two years after the entry into force of the Barce-
lona Convention, the parties have demonstrated their ability to cooperate in
transnational protection of the environment. Despite its deficiencies, the
Mediterranean Protocol, which includes nations in all stages of develop-
ment, will provide an invaluable negotiating model to the international
community in its battle to reduce marine pollution from land-based
sources.
Kevin W. Goering
136. Paris Convention, supra note 27, arts. 15-16. In addition to its functions with respect
to implementation and exchange of information, id. art. 16, the commission may propose
amendments to the list of controlled pollutants. Such amendments enter into effect unless the
parties specifically object. Id. art. 18(4).
137. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
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